A leaked internal memo has exposed a critical intelligence failure that preceded one of Nigeria’s deadliest communal attacks this year, revealing that the Department of State Services (DSS) had warned military commanders about planned assaults on Benue State communities a full month before the June 13 massacre that claimed over 200 lives.
The confidential DSS memo, dated May 13 and obtained by TheCable, was addressed to Moses Gara, Commander of Operation Whirl Stroke (OPWS), the military-led joint task force responsible for security in Nigeria’s volatile North Central region. The intelligence document provided chilling specificity about the impending violence, warning that suspected Fulani militias were plotting coordinated attacks on settlements across Benue and Nasarawa states in apparent retaliation for government seizure of cattle.
Among the eight communities specifically identified as targets was Yelewata in Guma Local Government Area, where more than 100 residents would later be killed in the June 13-14 assault. Other communities listed included Daudu, Akon, Chiata, Kaambe, Vandikya, Apelle, and parts of Makurdi, Agatu, and Gwer East/West. The memo detailed extensive intelligence on the attackers’ preparations, noting that militants had been “holding a series of meetings in Akpanaja, Rukuhi and Andori settlements in Doma LGA and have stationed their men at designated forests for a coordinated offensive.”
Despite the advance warning, the attackers successfully executed their plan through strategic misdirection. Chief of Defence Staff General Christopher Musa later confirmed that OPWS troops had been deployed to the area on the day of the attack but were diverted by false intelligence about an assault on a different village. “Because of the insider information, on the actual day that it happened, the troops were there,” General Musa explained. “There was a fake attack in the other village. When the troops moved in, that is when they came to attack the other one.”
The DSS memo had predicted this type of coordinated deception, noting that militants were “hibernating” in strategic forest locations including Amako and Igbabo forests between Mkoma and Doka villages, and in Ikom forest near the Yelwata-Udei-Ukohol axis. The document served as a comprehensive intelligence briefing that should have enabled effective countermeasures, yet the massacre proceeded with devastating efficiency.
Ironically, just two weeks before the massacre, Commander Gara had convened a high-level security meeting in Makurdi with representatives from the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders’ Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) and other stakeholders to address escalating tensions in the region. The May 28 meeting, according to Major Lawal Osabo, Acting Assistant Director of Army Public Relations, focused on “farmer-herder conflicts, retaliatory attacks, cattle rustling, and kidnappings.” Officials had promised that concerns raised would be forwarded to the state government and relevant security agencies.
The revelation of the DSS warning has intensified scrutiny of Nigeria’s security architecture and raised fundamental questions about intelligence sharing and response protocols. Critics argue that the specific nature of the warning—including exact community names and detailed intelligence on militant positions—should have triggered more robust preventive measures. The Benue State government has historically struggled with farmer-herder conflicts, with Governor Hyacinth Alia’s administration implementing controversial cattle seizure policies that appear to have contributed to the cycle of retaliatory violence referenced in the DSS memo.
The intelligence failure represents a significant embarrassment for Nigeria’s security establishment, particularly given the country’s ongoing battles with various insurgent groups and criminal networks across multiple regions. Human rights organizations have called for urgent reforms to improve intelligence coordination and community protection mechanisms. The massacre has also renewed debates about the effectiveness of military-led security operations in addressing Nigeria’s complex communal conflicts.
As investigations continue, families in Yelewata and surrounding communities remain displaced, with many questioning whether the tragedy could have been prevented had the May 13 intelligence warning been acted upon more decisively. The leaked memo serves as a stark reminder of the gap between intelligence gathering and operational response in Nigeria’s security framework—a gap that cost over 200 lives in Benue State’s latest communal tragedy.
